Stephen J. Wagner, Descartes on the Parts of the Soul, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45/1, 1984, 51-70.

Zwei Argumente für die Verschiedenheit des Körpers von der Seele:

1. conceivabbility of thpught without extension, AT VII 78,
2. indivisibility of mind, AT VII 85.

• Plato, Resp. IV 436b-37a, VIII.
• Plato, Resp. X 611b-612a; Phaedo 78bff.
• Hume, Treatise, Appendix.

Descartes' defence of simplicity does in a way rule out functional analyses of the mind (p. 209).

Wagner erläutert die Forderung nach Einheit der Seele anhand der Erfordernisse, die Descartes' Substanzbegriff stellt.

Descartes is apparently committed to the indivisibility of any substance (p. 214).

Das ist wenig erhellend, da die wichtigeren Fragen wären: Warum nennt Descartes die Seele 'Substanz' und warum hat er keinen anderen Substanzbegriff?

To use Dennett's terms, thinking, willing, perceiving, wanting, and so on are personal operations; the business of psychology is to analyse them into subpersonal processes. Personal operations are done by (whole) minds, which means, among other things, that anything capable of one must (...) be capable of the others (p. 217).

what emerges is that Aristotle and Descartes share, at bottom, a single error: the inability to conceive of a sub-personal psychology (p. 218).